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to fit the magnificence of this setting in Beijing’s Great hall of the 
people, and the honor of giving the 2007 sir John Crawford Memorial 
lecture, it is well to have a subject of suitable proportions. i have cho-
sen one of global size and urgent time frame: our climate crisis. We 
only have one future and one global climate—and now it looks as if 
we only have one chance to rescue our civilization from collapse and 
prevent a mass extinction of species during the 21st century.
unless you have been keeping up with climate science for the past 
twenty-five years, you likely do not know how serious the matter has 
become. the notion that we might slowly get into serious trouble by 
mid-century has been conveyed by the media and understood by at 
least some political leaders. But that scenario depends on somehow 
avoiding sudden shifts in climate in the meantime, instant setbacks at 
a time when we lack maneuvering room. an abrupt shift in drought 
area occurred in 1983 and we had a near-miss of a mass extinction of 
amazon species in 1999.
it is easy to appreciate that one more degree of global warming will 
seriously reduce crop yields in the tropics, but in the words of climate 
scientist Claudia tebaldi1, “it’s the extremes, not the averages, that 
cause the most damage to society and to many ecosystems.” even if 
you live where the average rainfall stays the same, there will still be 
more extreme weather such as floods and droughts. that they “bal-
ance out” will comfort no one.
4to illustrate this, recall the old joke about the statistician who 
drowned in a lake known to be, on average, only one meter deep. 
this is, of course, a slander on statisticians who know better than any-
one the variations in depth concealed by an average.
a moving average, created by worms stirring the ocean bottom, kept 
us from realizing that the “glacial pace of an ice age” was actually 
punctuated by very rapid (most of the way in five years) coolings and 
warmings. But since the changes only lasted centuries, their telltale 
sediments were churned sufficiently by the worms to make the record 
look smooth. (When moving averages are used to plot securities prices, 
they too conceal the brief periods when fortunes were made and lost.)
these ice age abrupt climate shifts made the transition in only about 
five or ten years, the time scale of a drought but with global scope. 
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Here is the ice core record from Greenland (happily worm-free) which shows what our 
Homo sapiens ancestors had to deal with in the middle of the last ice age as our 
higher intellectual abilities evolved.
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5their immediate causes are not what concern us at present, but 
rather some additional routes to making a sudden change in global 
climate that involve rearranging the customary winds.
The Clock is Running
i am a medical school professor and one of the things we try to teach 
physicians is to remember that a clock is always running, that there is 
such a thing as being certain but too late. “the doc who waits until 
dead certain of the diagnosis before starting treatment may wind up 
with a dead patient” reminds the medical student that textbook rigor 
may be out of place in a situation where irreversible damage may 
soon occur. senior military officers are also taught to think this way, 
but few scientists are. i picked it up myself only because of talking 
shop with the neurosurgeons for several decades.
politically, climate matters have already been “sent back for further 
study”—with action postponed—more often than was wise. We are 
now facing a planetary emergency where we have no time to search 
for the best or most economical treatment, nor can we wait for cap-
and-trade schemes to evolve better practices. even serious carbon 
taxes may be too slow. on the eve of a great war in 1940, president 
Franklin D. roosevelt used the metaphor of a “four alarm fire up the 
street” that needed to be extinguished immediately, whatever the 
cost. that’s where we should be now in responding to our climate 
crisis.
Global Fever 101
Briefly, the earth is overheating because of 1) the darkening of the 
earth’s surface by irrigation and soot which captures visible light that 
would otherwise be reflected back out into space, and 2) the green-
house gases that are growing an extra blanket of insulation around 
the earth, capturing infrared heat that would otherwise escape into 
space. together, they rearrange the winds and rains.
it is often claimed that our climate troubles are just “natural 
cycles,” about which we can do nothing. neither is true. We 
now have records of air composition that go back 800,000 years, 
enabling us to see the largest of the natural cycles. Both Co2 and 
methane go up during the warm periods that interrupt the ice ages, 
then back down during cooling. since about 1850 (expanded scale 
at right), both have soared (Co2 by 37%, methane by 130%) and 
are now far outside their natural range. temperature is beginning 
to follow. it would be much higher already except for the reflective 
haze from sulfates and ash, which masked a third of the expected 
rise in temperature.
it is much easier to see the signature of climate change in records of 
wind, rain, and fire. the strength of the east asian monsoon has been 
steadily weakening for four decades. each decade from 1950 to 1999 
saw a significant increase in major floods, and this was true world-
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7wide—showing that it wasn’t just local idiosyncrasies that produced 
the problem.
the same picture emerges when looking at major forest fires. Moving 
in lockstep, for both floods and fires, is global climate change.
While floods and fires have steadily increased over the fifty years, 
drought shows signs of even more abrupt stepwise change. some 
of the earliest warning came from perth’s reservoir inflows, which 
dropped in 1975 to half of the prior average. in 1997, this runoff took 
another step down to a third. Both were within a year of a big el niño.
not included in the 2007 ipCC reports is the recent analysis of global 
drought. in the 1970s, only 15% of the global land surface was 
in drought at any one time. By 1983, this had jumped to 25%. it 
Major Floods per Decade, 1950–2000
There is a consistent 50-year upward trend in every region except Oceania
Source: Millenium Ecosystem Assessment
occurred at about the time of the 1982 el Chichon volcanic eruption 
and the large 1982–1983 el niño. Whether a move is temporary or a 
new baseline can only be judged in retrospect. there have been fluc-
tuations to 35% but the new baseline is 25—which is an enormous 
two-thirds expansion of the 1970s drought area. and it only took a 
year to make the shift.
so where is all of this new drought? Much is adjacent to the dry 
bands of the tropics where the air that ascended in near-equatorial 
thunderstorms comes back down, minus its moisture, to create the 
characteristic deserts such as the sahara and Kalahari. the zones of 
Mediterranean climate are just above 30° from the equator and, while 
only on the western shores of a continent, they nicely illustrate the 
problem of expanding tropics.
they, like the adjacent deserts between 22° and 30°, lack rain in 
the summer. But the westerlies manage to push some low-pressure 
systems from offshore through Mediterranean climate zones in the 
winter, giving them their characteristic combination of winter rain and 
summer sun.
the desert border has already moved a few hundred km farther 
away from the equator. not only are the countries around the 
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Mediterranean suffering from a drier climate, but so is southern 
California, southern australia, and the southwest corner of south 
africa. Central Chile suffers drought especially during a la niña.
at least by the global drought measure, an abrupt climate change has 
already occurred from global warming, making our fixation on long-
term slow solutions seem especially shortsighted. it would be like an 
emergency-room physician talking to a patient about losing weight 
instead of focusing on the new chest pains that could be the begin-
ning of a heart attack.
Exit Amazonia? 
the amazon Basin is surprisingly vulnerable, even without all of the 
slash-and-burn land clearing for new agricultural fields, even without 
the seasonal burn before planting. Global warming is expected to 
change the rainfall patterns enough so that plant succession after a 
big fire will not advance beyond grass and brush.
this need not take all of the century to slowly occur. a big fire could 
happen at any time, given another big el niño that lasts long enough 
to dry out the amazon. the fire vulnerability map shows the condi-
tions at the end of the 1997–1998 el niño, which lasted about a 
year.
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We have seen longer 
el niños but they were 
not also big. the big 
ones (more than a 2°C 
temperature rise in the 
central pacific) may be 
new, a consequence of 
global warming. With 
only 10 to 15 years 
between past exam-
ples, we might soon 
see another big one 
and, given the stepwise 
changes associated 
with the three previous 
ones, we might also 
experience another 
step up into a worse 
climate.
the possibility that i find most appalling, however, is what would hap-
pen should a big el niño continue for an additional year. the fires 
in southeast asia and in the amazon Basin in 1997–1998 were bad 
enough; with a double-duration mega niño, we could lose major parts 
of two of the world’s three major rain forests in the tropics.
El Niño (warm)
La Niña (cool central Pacific Ocean)
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2000 ??
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and big
Neutral 
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Just after 1998 El Niño.
Nepstad et al., Forest Ecology & Management 154, 2001
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that’s a tipping point for which the global warming consequences 
would be severe. First, the excess Co2 in the atmosphere would go 
up 40% in a few years1. second, given all of the missing leaves, 
the annual Co2 emissions from fossil fuels would become 50% 
more effective in raising the temperature each year thereafter. third, 
we would lose about half of the plant and animal species in those 
rainforests, both from direct mortality and loss of habitat. it would 
be the first anthropogenic mass extinction. in 1999, we had a near-
miss on this catastrophe as the el niño quit just in time in 1998. 
as we continue to accelerate the use of fossil fuels (up 35% since 
1990, exceeding even the pessimistic business-as-usual scenarios 
used in climate models), that’s the kind of catastrophe we could 
trigger.
Threats to the Ocean Food Chain
life in the oceans has also been in trouble and it’s not just the fisher-
ies decline as there has been a decline in plankton as well. the heat-
ing of the near-surface layers during the 1982–1983 el niño reduced 
sea life around various pacific islands because the heat killed off 
much of the plankton at the bottom of the food chain, which then 
devastated the fisheries, the shore species, and the birds. the 2005 
hurricane season in the Caribbean was associated with enough days 
of excessive temperature to kill many coral reefs, even down to a 70 
meter depth in the virgin islands.
ocean acidification of 0.1 ph unit occurred in the 20th century and the 
forecast for this century is for another 0.3. thus fossil fuel emissions 
have a dual effect: the usual one from over-insulating the earth, and a 
1 Excess CO2 is that above the preindustrial concentration—say the 280 ppm maximum 
during recent warm periods of the ice ages. We are currently above 380 ppm, a 100 ppm 
excess, and a Big Burn of the Amazon and Borneo rain forests would add another 40 ppm. 
Forests take many decades to grow back but Amazonia will become stuck at the succession 
stage of grass and brush, so its carbon becomes a “permanent” addition to the air. Indeed, 
given our half-century time scale, few forests will re-grow enough after fire to balance their 
loss. All such fires are setbacks for us and the species likely to go extinct.
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second direct effect on the acidification of the near-surface oceans as 
they absorb Co2 from the air bubbles buried under crashing waves.
there was a brief respite in the warming of most of the world’s 
oceans in the early 1990s from volcanic sulfates injected into the 
stratosphere. even when heat waves are moderated by reflecting more 
sunlight back into space, the ph effect of the continuing emissions of 
Co2 can get us into serious trouble from damaging the bottom of the 
ocean’s food chain.
Undermining Ice Sheets
sea level was more than 6 meters higher than present during the 
eemian warm period about 125,000 years ago. Greenland’s ice 
was particularly vulnerable then, with summer temperatures at 
about what 1.6°C of global fever would produce there now (we 
are now at 0.7° above preindustrial global mean temperature). the 
West antarctic ice sheet likely contributed some more water when 
undermined by the rise in sea level from Greenland’s collapse. in 
Greenland, melt water falling down deep cracks carries heat to 
the bottom of the ice sheets, creating rotten ice that allows the ice 
sheet to slip downhill into the ocean more quickly. the new icebergs 
instantly raise sea level.
sea levels may rise 
more quickly than 
what the drip-by-drip 
2007 ipCC models 
indicate (about 0.3 
meter this century 
and half is from ther-
mal expansion of 
the existing oceans). 
some glaciologists 
worry about a rise 
of 2 to 3 meters this 
century. eventually 
about 50 meters 
should be seen for a 
6m (20 ft) rise in sea level
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3°C rise, judging from the 4 million year history of global tempera-
ture and sea level. 
let me stick to the first 6 meter rise, which is about the height of a 
two-story beach house. along the east and Gulf Coasts of the u.s. 
with their shallow slopes, that can mean an inundation reaching 
150 km inland in places, with 15 million people displaced in Florida 
alone. But most of the misery will come from river deltas whose fertile 
soils and plentiful water support high populations at present. half of 
Bangladesh will be underwater when sea level rises 6 m, creating 70 
million climate refugees on their side of the Ganges Delta alone. it’s a 
similar situation for all of the river deltas in southeast asia and China.
as with more immediate refugees from the droughts in the 
Mediterranean climate zones, where will such climate refugees go? 
What will be the reaction when they cross borders in great numbers? 
What country will try to take over the resources of a neighbor, push-
ing its inhabitants out into a third country? 
the Four horsemen of the apocalypse tend to be featured on such 
occasions: famine, pestilence, war, and death from genocide. the lat-
ter will have a long-lasting legacy: the downsized populations will all 
hate their neighbors for good reasons. 
The Origins of CO2 and its Equivalents
per unit of useful energy, coal produces the most Co2, natural gas 
less than half as much, with oil in the middle. once it gets into the 
air, Co2 is slow to get out, with half remaining several centuries later. 
and because the ocean’s capacity to absorb it is limited, a fourth of 
the excess Co2 may still be around in a thousand years.
Methane from natural gas and low-oxygen decomposition is twenty 
times more potent as heat insulation, once it gets into the air. so 
we talk of its “Co2 equivalent” as being twenty times as much. But 
methane is not equivalent in other ways, as half of the methane 
released into the atmosphere this year will have disappeared about six 
years from now. stopping the leaks from natural gas pipelines (1 to 
4% of what is carried) will improve things almost immediately, where-
14
as Co2 declines will take centuries unless we remove it from the air to 
reverse climate change.
the pie chart of the uses which create Co2 and equivalents shows 
that fossil fuel uses are about two-thirds of the total. transportation 
uses (mostly oil) are 14% of the pie—but so too is agriculture, what 
with feed lots, fertilizer, and tilling the soil. even more startling to 
me was the 18% slice for changes in land use, some of which is 
urban sprawl but much of which is land clearing for marginal agri-
culture.
so while burning fossil fuels is two-thirds of the problem, much of the 
rest is associated with agriculture. Certainly, many of the opportuni-
ties to fix our global climate lie in the agricultural sector because there 
is so much “low-hanging fruit” there—irrigation, tilling, feedlot, and 
fertilizer practices being what they currently are.
CO2 comes from
Power (24%)
Streetlights,
your electricity bills
Transport (14%)
Oil for vehicles
Land use (18%)
Loss of sinks by 
clearing forest
Agriculture (14%)
Fertilizing, tilling 
speeds soil 
decomposition
Waste (3%)
Methane from 
dumps
Industry (14%)
Smelting aluminium, 
building cars, etc.
Other energy 
related (5%)
Buildings (14%)
Equivalents to CO2
Source: Year 2000 GtC via WRI, Sir Nick Stern 2006 slide.
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For transportation, we 
need to replace petrol 
with electricity, either 
via batteries or electric-
ity-generated hydrogen 
fuel cells—or simply 
compressed air, driving 
a piston engine with 
injections of high-pres-
sure air. i expect that 
the air Car will be a 
popular choice in the 
tropics because of the 
free air cooling for the 
occupants (the vehicle will also be warm in the early morning after 
overnight recharging of the tanks). india’s largest automaker expects 
to have 6,000 taxicabs running on compressed air in 2008. 
Electricity and its Uses
in the u.s., 86% of our total energy use comes from fossil fuels. only 
14% is clean, mostly from hydro and nuclear. 
if we focus on electricity generation, then we are 32% clean. 
thanks to 35 years of expanding nuclear, France’s electricity is 91% 
clean, and next door in switzerland, it is 99% clean (half hydro, 
half nuclear). next door in Germany, electricity is only 42% clean. in 
many countries such as india, China, and the uK, less than 25% is 
clean.
regional variations neatly show the role of government energy 
policy, even within the u.s. per person electricity consumption in 
California is only half that in texas and new York state is almost as 
thrifty. even more impressive is that California has kept that figure 
from growing for 35 years, at a time when many states doubled per 
capita consumption. so part of the solution is simply copying the 
practices of the successful (California initially set standards for appli-
ance efficiency and codes for new housing). unfortunately, that now 
isn’t fast enough.
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The Window of Opportunity is Rapidly Closing
at a time when architects are thinking ahead to more efficient build-
ings and power planners are extolling the virtues of “renewable 
energy,” the climate modelers have discovered that long-term plan-
ning will no longer suffice. our fossil fuel fiasco has already painted 
us into a corner such that, if we don’t make substantial near-term 
gains before 2020, the long-term is pre-empted, the efforts all for 
naught.
if the world keeps on with Business as usual expansion of energy use, 
the world will be about 6°C warmer by the end of this century (the 
interior of continents will warm about twice as much, as will the high 
latitudes). if the world manages to get its growth from clean sources 
while not increasing fossil fuel uses, this so-called “stabilization” in 
emissions would still leave us adding carbon to the atmosphere, mere-
ly at a constant rate each year. this is the most minimal of targets 
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California has long taken environmental issues more seriously than the United States as 
a whole. They have held electricity use per person down to 1970s amounts (and saved 
$1,000 per family annually) while the rest of the U.S. has doubled consumption per person.
United States California
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adapted from Science, 23 November 2007 news article
and hardly deserves being called stabilization since climate change will 
continue getting worse.
if this limitation of emissions is achieved by 2040, the global mean 
temperature goes up about 3°C. if it is achieved by 2020, we 
might be able to hold it to 2°. the consequences of a 2° fever are 
1
bad but nothing like the world of climate refugees that a 3° fever 
will create. 
Furthermore, such a minimal goal will do nothing to relieve our 
climate problems. it takes more than stopping new emissions. it 
requires actually removing the Co2 from the air. the 2007 ipCC 
report didn’t even consider such scenarios but i have sketched one 
out below.
the zero-crossing in 2040, where remaining fossil carbon emissions 
are offset by new carbon sequestration, might more reasonably be 
called climate stabilization—except for the delayed warming (0.6°C in 
a century) and the continuing vulnerability to the big one-off events 
such as burning down the rain forests. it is only when we haul the 
Co2 down to levels last seen in mid-20th century—and with it the 
fever—that we may escape the excess exposure to such big events. 
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that might be a better goal to aspire to, and a better use of the term 
“climate stabilization.” it is about time we started thinking in terms of 
a cure for climate disease, not just buying time.
Taking Carbon Out of Circulations
nature removes atmospheric carbon by photosynthesis and by 
“weathering” rock. the latter counts on the million year time scale, 
but we need something quicker.
We are more familiar with green leaves but the floating microalgae 
in the oceans—called phytoplankton and usually seen as unwanted 
scum on the walls of an aquarium—do more than half of the world’s 
conversion of Co2 into o2. Which is fortunate, because of the afore-
mentioned fire hazard from stronger, hotter, and drier winds in the 
coming decades. planting more trees cannot be relied upon to keep 
the carbon out of circulation.
the ocean depths are an excellent carbon storehouse as those waters 
are rarely “ventilated” to the atmosphere except on the million year 
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time scale. What do we need to do to sequester more carbon on the 
decade scale?
algal reproduction is usually limited by nutrients. long-lasting blooms 
occur near the mouth of a river (or sewage outfall). episodic blooms 
tend to occur via wind-driven upwelling of deeper waters, bringing 
some of the falling nutrients back up to the top. however, unless 
there is also enough iron in surface waters, there will be no bloom. 
iron naturally arrives via dust blown into the oceans. stimulating or 
prolonging algal “blooms” via iron fertilization has been investigated 
for more than a decade.
Beginning about a week after an algal bloom starts, a zooplankton 
bloom appears, a mix of lots of little animals, some of which will grow 
into bigger animals if they avoid getting eaten in the meantime. some 
little animals such as the microsnails, diatoms, and coccolithophores 
grow shells of calcium carbonate. When they die, the shell sinks 
into the ocean depths. some become limestone. ocean acidification 
threatens to interfere with making such shells.
a second way that the primary production’s carbon is sunk is via fecal 
pellets of larger animals that graze on the plankton. Many species are 
simply too small, their feces merely mixing right back into the nutrient 
soup of the near-surface ocean. salps are large enough to produce 
fecal pellets that are compact and heavy enough to sink into the 
ocean depths before disintegrating. Filter-feeding whales are even bet-
ter, though greatly expanding their numbers would be a century-long 
project because of their slow lifespan.
the important thing is to reduce atmospheric Co2 concentration. 
Just as taking fossil carbon out of storage has increased the amount 
in circulation between the atmosphere and the land and ocean 
surface, so we can take organic carbon out of circulation in deep 
landfills. an important lesson comes from the comparison of the 
muddy waters of the amazon and those of the himalaya monsoon 
runoff through Bangladesh and india. Most of the organic carbon 
that settles out on the atlantic continental shelf decomposes and 
contributes its Co2 to the atmosphere, but only about 30% of the 
himalaya monsoon runoff decomposes as the end of season runoff 
21
effectively caps the peak runoff before it can decompose2. about 
70% is safely sequestered. only the top 10 cm remains exposed to 
circulating seawater with oxygen. in a similar manner, we might bury 
biomass in sealed landfills and create a cascade of managed set-
tling ponds for the slower muddy rivers. this would also save soil for 
future generations.
The Climate Optimist
When most people first come to realize our peril from climate change, 
they are unable to imagine how we might get ourselves out of the 
mess. sometimes failure of imagination does indeed determine our 
future, but thanks to our accumulated intellectual achievements, a 
third industrial revolution is likely coming, one that will replace fossil 
fuels and create nonpolluting agriculture.
the problem for an optimist, however, is time. We have been 
painted into a corner by our accelerating use of fossil fuels in the 
last fifty years. now we are forced to act quickly to produce major 
accomplishments by 2020. so let me sketch out a near-term agenda 
using existing technology that is capable of heading off the 3° 
future fever.
our enthusiasm for long-term thinking is, sad to say, short-sighted 
given the 2020 emergency. rapid transit requires decades to build. 
City planning helps only in the long term, not much in the near term. 
i’m inclined to put the big money elsewhere for now. What we do for 
2020 will reframe the problem, and new science and technology by 
then will hopefully show us a better long-term path.
all-electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids will shift the transportation 
sector’s energy needs from oil to whatever produces the local 
electricity. this need not mean batteries on board as the electrical 
power can be used to create some other intermediary fuel, hydro-
gen for fuel cells or compressed air for driving the pistons of an air 
engine. this will get rid of much of the Co2 from petrol. even if 
the electricity comes from coal, there’s a large gain because of size 
efficiencies and avoiding the waste of idling internal combustion 
engines in traffic jams.
it’s obvious that we need to ban new coal plants. in my opinion, we 
must start cloning nuclear and geothermal power plants at a rate 
sufficient for new demand and for shutting down old coal plants in 
the next decade. anything that cannot reproduce at the gigawatt per 
week level will need to take a back seat to the more sure-fire meth-
ods for cleaning up half of the dirty electricity in the next decade. 
not even the largest solar and wind installation comes close to a 
24/7 gigawatt, and adding a gigawatt every week from them seems 
decades off. 
22
Hot Rock Energy
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hanging over all of these ideas is the global aspect of Co2. We must 
make sure that developing countries do not modernize by burning 
their own coal and oil. that means helping them with solar thermal or 
geothermal installations which run steam plants, in return for binding 
agreements not to add fossil carbon to the air. it means technology 
suitable to local resources, not importing photovoltaic panels, batter-
ies, and fuel cells with scarce foreign currency earned through exports.
as i see it, we already have most of the technology to make the 
low-carbon transition. the science is in good shape too, developing 
considerable momentum. the major challenge is the fast response 
needed from ethical, economic, and political leaders.
Arming for a Great War
preventing the 3° fever is the Great use-it-or-lose-it intelligence 
test. and we are dealing with the time frame used centuries ago 
by edmund Burke when he said, “the public interest requires doing 
today those things that men of intelligence and goodwill would wish, 
five or ten years hence, had been done.”
We are already in dangerous territory and have to act quickly to avoid 
triggering widespread catastrophes. the only good analogy is arming 
for a great war, doing what must be done regardless of cost and con-
venience.
if you haven’t already, i would suggest reading 
Jared Diamond. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. 
viking, 2005. 
al Gore. An Inconvenient Truth. rodale press, 2006. 
Joseph J. romm. Hell and High Water. William Morrow, 2007. 
robert henson. The Rough Guide to Climate Change. rough Guides, 
2006. 
Mark lynas. Six Degrees. Fourth estate, 2007. 
Brian Fagan. The Long Summer: How Climate Changed Civilization. 
Basic Books, 2004.
tim Flannery. The Weather Makers. atlantic Monthly press, 2005. 
ross Gelbspan. Boiling Point. Basic Books, 2004.
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elizabeth Kolbert. Field Notes from a Catastrophe. Bloomsbury, 2006.
James lovelock. The Revenge of Gaia. penguin/allen lane, uK, 2006.
George Monbiot. Heat: How to Stop the Planet Burning. penguin/
allen lane, uK, 2006.
Fred pearce. The Last Generation: How Nature Will Take her Revenge 
for Climate Change. eden project Books, uK, 2006.
a. Barrie pittock. Climate Change: Turning Up the Heat. Csiro, 
australia, 2005.
phillip W. schewe. The Grid. Joseph henry press , Washington DC, 
2007.
spencer r. Weart. The Discovery of Global Warming. harvard 
university press, 2003. updated version at www.aip.org/history/
climate.
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